Bad Boat Fire Santa Cruz Island

I didn’t know propane wasn’t allowed on inspected vessels but it is something i never want to have on board. All cooking is electric even the grill on th boat I run although charcoal on my own.

33 pax means at least 66 devices to charge. Figure at least a phone and a GoPro each. That’s many strips n cords
 
My original thought was hot cooking oil spill ( NO EVIDENCE OF THIS ), but the "charging incident" idea might work as a hypothesis. Esp since I just recently had a LiIon cell short and RUD on my desk. ( 3 watt battery, fully charged, + dead short = big hot mess )
 
High capacity lithium batteries continue to be life threatening. Not to hijack the thread, but I loaned my hangar to a guy from Canada who is the brother of a.fellow owner at the airport. They departed for Osh Kosh in July. Along around Chatanooga, the entire electrical system quit. This airplane was a Glasair homebuilt and the owner elected to use electronic ignition sources for both ignition systems. With the electrical failure the engine quit, he glided down through an overcast he was on top of, broke out, was gliding to an open field, overshot that, tried to put it into a smaller field, crashed, dragged himself from wreckage, airplane consumed by a fire that was started by a LITHIUM ION battery. The FAA is getting ready to certify these things for certified aircraft and I think it is the worst idea in the history of aviation. I have been all over the aviation boards trying to spread the word. The owner of the Glasair is still in the hospital in Nashville.

You need to be very wary of these batteries.
 
ATF now involved in the investigation. Vessel owner has filed for "Limitation of Liability" action, which is expected. Portable chargers and battery packs appear to be a point of focus. Lack of a roving Fire Watch mentioned. This is a wood boat, but I think the hull was sheathed in fiberglass, which is really rare in an Inspected, multi passenger, over night vessel. Did that cause the fire? I doubt it, but it certainly added to the deadly gasses, once the fire got going. You don't want a fixed CO2 fire suppression system in a bunkroom for obvious reasons, but there are Salt Water Mist Sprinkler Systems that could be used to protect a bunkroom. You do run the risk that the system could be accidentally set off and you end up spraying salt water on your passengers as they sleep and wetting a bunch of expensive gear (but hey it's a dive boat). But I would rather deal with a bunch of pissed off passengers than have to deal with what this vessel owner will be going through. If the vessel's crew did not demonstrate the location and how to use the emergency escape hatch during the vessel's pre-departure brief the crew was, in my opinion, negligent. To protect themselves from criminal prosecution, the crew will say they did a complete brief, but the problem is that no one survived to counter that assertion as Dead Men tell No Tales. The passengers have been described as "having been on the dive boat for several trips and were experienced with the ways of the vessel". That, along with a complacent/poorly trained crew may be the part that killed them all. One thing that is missing from all this, is the concern for pollution in a National Sea Park, in California. The Master may end up serving more time for oiling a few sea birds than for the deaths of his passengers.
 
Question Why would ATF be involved other than to lend analysis to accelerants, which I assume the FBI is equally competent and the NTSB is no slouch either.
 
US Flag Passenger Vessel, US Citizens on US Flag Passenger Vessel, Unknown cause and origin of a fire on US Flag Passenger Vessel, Dead US Citizens on US Flag Passenger Vessel, US Flag Passenger Vessel Operating as a Concessionaire to US Park Service, US Flag Passenger Vessel has fire of unknown cause and origin while in the confines of a US Park Service (partially) owned island, Possible Criminal Charges against vessel crew and vessel owner/operator. I'm sure there are some other reasons but take your pick from the above list. A fatal fire on any boat operating in the US has a very formal protocol that must be followed for the final investigation report to mean anything. The use of an accelerate is one of the easiest conditions to identify in a boat fire, especially on a wood boat. NTSB's role is to investigate and report to Congress what, if any possible Regulations or Laws are needed to prevent future incidents. I don't know if NTSB has arrest powers or if they can pursue criminal charges.
 
So the fire started at the aft end of the salon. Also says the crew tried to come in thru a window near the forward end, what about doors? No doors? If the fire was near the aft end, the main stairs would have been clear

Mystery gets deeper
 
Nothing in the preliminary report even remotely deals with where the fire originated. One crew member described what he saw when he woke up, he saw fire reaching the height of the pilothouse deck level. There were no doors on the forward section of main deck level house. The windows were to be used as emergency exits, but the release handles are on the inside of the window, not accessible from the outside. No roving fire watch as the crew was asleep. With six crew aboard, the night watch could have been split 6 and 6, then everybody would have been well rested the next day. I hope you operators of Rule Beater Charter Yachts take note, some of these guys are going to end up in a world of $hit and they operated an inspected vessel. The local USCG Office of Marine Inspection will end up with egg on their faces before this is over.
 
quote:

Originally posted by L. Keith

Nothing in the preliminary report even remotely deals with where the fire originated. One crew member described what he saw when he woke up, he saw fire reaching the height of the pilothouse deck level. There were no doors on the forward section of main deck level house. The windows were to be used as emergency exits, but the release handles are on the inside of the window, not accessible from the outside. No roving fire watch as the crew was asleep. With six crew aboard, the night watch could have been split 6 and 6, then everybody would have been well rested the next day. I hope you operators of Rule Beater Charter Yachts take note, some of these guys are going to end up in a world of $hit and they operated an inspected vessel. The local USCG Office of Marine Inspection will end up with egg on their faces before this is over.






I’ll readily admit I’ve come around to your opinion on this one. The lithium ion battery thing is the leading theory, and a live roving watch likely may have made a difference. I don’t know that OCMI will take a hit on this, though, depending on how the COI is written. I WOULD bet we’re going to see an NVIC from NMC about lithium ion batteries, though.
 
Lithium Ion batteries are on every boat... small like GoPro and drones and large as in seabobs and eFoils. Time to reconsider how they re charged

That said in this case earlier information pointed to the charging station being forward near the galley which is not where the fire appeared to have started

How could the USCG sign off on a boat carrying up to 46 overnight pax in a below deck bunk room with only one exit is just plain mind boggling

Poke fun at “rule beater charter yachts” but EVERY stateroom has a fire extinguisher, CO and Smoke detector and more than one exit... in this case an inspected vessel was clearly deficient to the point that the USCG has to issue an emergency notice ... don’t get me wrong.. I have the upmost respect for the USCG but I think it’s inspectors dropped the ball there. L
 
quote:

Originally posted by PascalG

Lithium Ion batteries are on every boat... small like GoPro and drones and large as in seabobs and eFoils. Time to reconsider how they re charged

That said in this case earlier information pointed to the charging station being forward near the galley which is not where the fire appeared to have started

How could the USCG sign off on a boat carrying up to 46 overnight pax in a below deck bunk room with only one exit is just plain mind boggling

Poke fun at “rule beater charter yachts” but EVERY stateroom has a fire extinguisher, CO and Smoke detector and more than one exit... in this case an inspected vessel was clearly deficient to the point that the USCG has to issue an emergency notice ... don’t get me wrong.. I have the upmost respect for the USCG but I think it’s inspectors dropped the ball there. L






There WAS alternate egress. I’m trying to make sure I limit my comments to what’s been published in the news, but the most recent articles based on the NTSB’s initial report (the “vanilla” report with few details) indicate the fire may have originated, or at least been more intense when discovered, in the after end of the salon, where the alternate egress (“escape hatch”) has previously been reported to be.

I also question the arrangements where a mass conflagration blocking the alternate egress blocks primary egress by default. That’s an odd bit of logic to me, too. Blocked primary is the reason for alternate egress - but if the arrangement is such that primary is definitely blocked when alternate is, that fails the logic test in my mind.
 
Actually, any watch, let alone a roving watch would have mad a difference here.
 
Apparently both lead to the same space (main deck) which only had exits aft where the fire was. The crew was tying to open a window from the outside, no door.
 
both exits led into the Galley on the main deck. Have not seen any description of exits from the galley
 
quote:

Originally posted by getakey

both exits led into the Galley on the main deck. Have not seen any description of exits from the galley






The report (linked above) states the crew couldn’t get to help passengers in thru the doors at the rear of the main deck as that section was engulfed in flames. It also states they tried to open a window in the forward section but were overwhelmed by smoke.

The fact they were trying to open a window indicates there were no doors by the galley. None can be seen on the side in the picture shown in the report

It also raises more questions

- They couldn’t open the window and apparently had nothing to smash it. A fire extinguisher would have done the trick. Did they leave the top deck without a fire extinguisher? Or were there none on the flybridge?

- if indeeed there were no doors at the forward end, this is a major flaw both design and inspection. How could there be only one exit, Above the engine room no less

- how could there not be more than one ladder/stairs to access the flybridge? One crew broke a leg jumping...
 
quote:

Originally posted by PascalG

quote:

Originally posted by getakey

both exits led into the Galley on the main deck. Have not seen any description of exits from the galley






The report (linked above) states the crew couldn’t get to help passengers in thru the doors at the rear of the main deck as that section was engulfed in flames. It also states they tried to open a window in the forward section but were overwhelmed by smoke.

The fact they were trying to open a window indicates there were no doors by the galley. None can be seen on the side in the picture shown in the report

It also raises more questions

- They couldn’t open the window and apparently had nothing to smash it. A fire extinguisher would have done the trick. Did they leave the top deck without a fire extinguisher? Or were there none on the flybridge?

- if indeeed there were no doors at the forward end, this is a major flaw both design and inspection. How could there be only one exit, Above the engine room no less

- how could there not be more than one ladder/stairs to access the flybridge? One crew broke a leg jumping...








I'm not going to pretend to be an expert on 46CFR subchapter T, but if memory serves me a portable fire extinguisher is required at the main control station. I remember having to look that up - the specific requirements for the extinguisher - when I sat for my license ages ago...long enough that I don't remember the details, but I'm pretty sure one is required. I'll send you a PM with further.
 
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